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Résumé: Les biais de sélection sont créés par des disparités entre le domaine d'estimation d'un modèle 
statistique et son domaine d'application. C'est le cas pour les modèles évaluant le risque de 
fraude, qui sont estimés sur les seuls sinistres audités mais appliqués sur tous les sinistres 
entrants.  Or les sinistres audités sont une minorité, étant choisis suite à une sélection sévère 
effectuée par des experts. Ce papier présente une approche statistique qui contrebalance le 
biais de sélection sans recourir à une stratégie d'audit aléatoire. On estime un modéle à deux 
équations sur l'audit et la fraude (un modèle probit bivarié avec censure), sur une une partie 
d'une base de sinistres où les experts sont laissés libres de leur décision d'auditer. On corrige 
ainsi la surestimation attendue du risque de fraude en cas d'estimation d'une seule équation. 
Les résultats sont proches de ceux obtenus par audit aléatoire, au prix d'une instabilité des 
résultats par rapport à l'ensemble des composantes de régression. On compare ensuite des 
politiques d'audit à partir des différentes approches.   
 
Abstract:  Selection bias results from a discrepancy between the range of estimation of a statistical model 
and its range of application. This is the case for fraud risk models, which are estimated on 
audited claims but applied on incoming claims in the design of auditing strategies. Now audited 
claims are a minority within the parent sample since they are chosen after a severe selection 
performed by claims adjusters. This paper presents a statistical approach which counteracts 
selection bias without using a random auditing strategy. A two equation model on audit and 
fraud (a bivariate probit model with censoring) is estimated on a sample of claims where the 
experts are left free to take the audit decision. The expected overestimation of fraud risk 
derived from a single equation model is corrected. Results are rather close to those obtained 
with a random auditing strategy, at the expense of some instability with respect to the 
regression components set. Then we compare auditing policies derived from the different 
approaches. 
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1 Introduction
Auditing policies derived from statistical analysis and applied to insurance claims
(see Section 2 for an overview) face a major selection bias problem. A score which
assesses fraud risk is derived from a regression analysis on audited claims, as fraud
is checked on the audited claims only. Then the score is applied to incoming claims
in order to select those which are then recommended for audit. Now audited claims
are a minority within the parent sample as they are chosen after a severe selection
performed by claims adjusters. This discrepancy between the range of derivation of
the risk model (i.e. the audited claims) and the range of application (the incoming
claims) creates a selection bias.
Random auditing of claims is the basic strategy which makes it possible to coun-
teract selection bias. A pure random auditing strategy consists in picking claims at
random, then in auditing these claims. This controlled experiment eliminates the
selection induced by the audit decision. The estimation of a single fraud equation
in this sample provides an estimated fraud probability for incoming claims which is
not subject to selection bias.
Random auditing was partly carried out on the database we investigated. Twenty
percent of the claims were thus selected and recommended for audit. However, only
one claim out of five was eventually audited in this population because all the
incoming claims were not suspicious with respect to fraud (see Section 2 for more
details about auditing processes). Optimal auditing strategies can be designed from
the estimation of a fraud equation on the audited claims (see Ayuso, Guillén et al.
(2004) for derivations with the database used in this paper).
Most insurance companies are reluctant to carry out a random auditing policy.
This is because the long term influence of an audit decision on the policyholder’s
value for the company is negative. Indeed, an honest policyholder may take the audit
process amiss and his loyalty to the company should decrease as a consequence, as
well as his value for the insurer. Hence companies are deterred from performing
a systematic audit on part of their claims database. Without a random auditing
policy, the eﬀect of selection bias on fraud risk assessment can easily be anticipated.
The experts take an audit decision based on the claim characteristics recorded in
the company files. However, they are also able to capture idiosyncrasies in fraud
distributions which are not summarized in the observable information. Given the
observable characteristics, fraud risk is expected to be less significant for a claim
exempted from audit by the expert than for another one checked for fraud. A fraud
risk model derived without taking this selection problem into account would then
overestimate fraud probabilities for the incoming claims.
In the absence of random auditing, a statistical approach can counteract selection
bias by using a two equation model. An audit equation is estimated together with
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another equation for fraud, which is estimated only on the audited claims. From
a joint distribution of the random components in each equation, we can condition
fraud risk on claim characteristics and on whether or not the claim was retained for
audit by the claims adjusters. To our knowledge, selection models have not been
applied to date in the literature on claim auditing strategies.
Selection models can be designed with or without censoring for the variable of
interest. In our context, data are censored, as fraud is checked on the audited claims
only1. We will use a bivariate probit model for audit and fraud. The estimated
correlation coeﬃcient between the two equations is expected to be positive since
it reflects the ability of claims adjusters to assess hidden characteristics in fraud
distributions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how fraud detection strate-
gies for automobile insurance claims are implemented in insurance companies. Sec-
tion 3 describes the database. Section 4 presents the bivariate probit model and its
application to the correction of selection bias. We consider a natural extension of the
single equation probit model for the fraud variable (see Belhadji, Dionne, Tarkhani
(2000) and Artis, Ayuso, Guillén (2002) for the inclusion of misclassification risk
in the fraud equation). Our claims database is split into two populations. Claims
selected at random (one out of five) are recommended for audit, whereas there is no
specific recommendation for other claims. We will use the latter population as the
working sample, since such claims are subject to selection bias. The claims that are
selected at random will be used as a holdout sample, to assess the eﬃciency of the
statistical model. The estimated correlation coeﬃcient in the bivariate probit model
was found to be positive for our data. This means that, if we control for observable
information on claims, fraud risk is lower for claims exempted from audit by the
experts.
Optimal auditing policies which take into account selection bias are presented in
Section 5, and Section 6 contains concluding remarks.
2 Fraud detection strategies on automobile insur-
ance claims and selection bias issues
Most property and liability insurers include fraud warning systems in their routine
claims handling process. In order to identify fraudulent insurance claims at an early
stage, most systems score a new incoming claim using a set of fraud indicators.
If the score is high enough, then the claim is audited and fraud (or abuse) may
be confirmed2. Only claims with a high suspicion level (or score) are selected for
1Heckman (1979) is the seminal paper on selection bias in a censored setting.
2See Derrig (2002) for a comprehensive description of insurance fraud types.
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investigation.
In most European countries, when an insurer finds a claim which shows evidence
of fraud, an agreement with the policyholder is usually reached. Most settlements
involve the policy not being renewed. Others lead to a reduction in the claim
compensation. This situation is in contrast with the highly litigious US system.
However, even if very few fraudulent claims are brought to court, many European
insurers are beginning to implement strategies to control fraud.
Let us now formalize the selection bias issue. If all incoming claims can be
considered for audit, the selection bias issue can be formalized in the following way:
A and F denote the binary variables related to audit and fraud, and x is the vector of
variables which describe the claim. A statistical model assessing fraud risk is derived
from the audited claims and estimates probabilities of the type P (F = 1 |A =
1, x) = E(F |A = 1, x). Now an audit policy induced by this model is applied on
the incoming claims, and uses the probabilities P (F = 1 | x) = E(F | x). Selection
bias is a consequence of the confusion between the conditional and unconditional
probabilities.
In reality, not all the incoming claims are likely to be audited. A description
of the audit process will explain why. All the incoming claims are initially checked
by the adjusters. They consider the causes of car damages, the circumstances of
the accident and the policy characteristics. A claim that the adjuster does not find
suspicious will always be exempted from audit and settled routinely. Audit means
that the claim is transferred to a Special Investigation Unit, hereafter referred to as
SIU. This unit provides a further assessment of the claim and decides whether to
consider it as fraudulent or not.
Hence, a variable related to fraud suspicion is created by the adjuster before the
audit decision. We denote it as S. For this binary variable, we have
S = 0⇒ A = 0. (1)
The condition given in (1) simply means that the audit decision is nested inside
the selection decision induced by S. Since both variables S and A are binary, this
condition amounts to A ≤ S. A claim for which S = 1 will be referred to later as
suspected of fraud. Conversely, S = 0 when the initial screening reveals no fraud
suspicion. Another reason (although less frequent) which leads to S = 0 is that no
loss is expected. This could happen if the insurer of the third party pays for the car
damages or if the deductible exceeds the claim cost.
As only the claims suspected of fraud are likely to be audited, selection bias now
reflects the confusion between P (F = 1 |A = 1, x) and P (F = 1 |S = 1, x), under
the condition given in (1). This bias increases with the proportion of suspicious
claims that are not audited, and is eliminated if A = S in the sample. Such a
sample is created by a random auditing strategy, designed in the following way.
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First, a population of claims is selected at random, and the treatment (using the
vocabulary of experience plans) is to audit all of the suspicious claims. This pair
of actions (the random selection of claims, plus treatment) provides a controlled
experiment which eliminates selection bias if the fraud equation is estimated from
these claims.
The audit decision for suspicious claims is transferred to the adjusters if there is
no random auditing strategy. An expert takes this decision on the basis of an implicit
trade-oﬀ between the estimated audit cost and the gain from fraud detection. Most
of the suspicious claims are not audited if the audit decision is left to the experts
(see for instance Section 3).
To sum up, Figure 1 describes the links between the three binary variables S, A
and F , depending on the audit strategy.
Figure 1: The binary variables S, A and F and audit strategies
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3 Presentation of the database
The claims database belongs to an insurance company operating in Spain. The
claims are linked to motor insurance contracts and were reported during 2000. The
structure of the database is described in Figure 2. The number of claims and the
weight with respect to the parent node are given under each node of the tree.
Figure 2: The claims database
Working sample
Usual auditing strategy
(A≤S)
Holdout sample
Random auditing
(A=S)
64785 claims
HHHHHHHH
©©©©©©©©
12928 (20%)
A
A
A
A
¡
¡
¡
¡
51857 (80%)
A=0 A=1 A=0 A=1
A
A
A
A
¡
¡
¡
¡
10525 (81.4%) 2403 (18.6%)
A
A
A
A
¡
¡
¡
¡
49290 (95%) 2567 (5%)
A
A
A
A
¡
¡
¡
¡
F=0 F=1
2229 (92.8%) 174 (7.2%)
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2060 (80.2%) 507 (19.8%)
Let comment on the numbers of claims, according to their type. The proportion
of claims selected for random auditing is 20%. If random auditing is performed
thoroughly, all the claims that are suspected of fraud are audited. Therefore, their
weight in the sample is 18.6%. From the definition of S given in Section 2, this
means that the first screening reveals no suspicion of fraud for the other claims or
that no loss is expected for the insurance company.
The other sample represents eighty percent of the claims. The audit decision on
these claims is left to the adjusters. The audit rate in this sample is close to five
percent, which is much less than for the first sample of randomly selected claims. The
two samples have the same structure as selection in the first sample was performed
at random. Therefore, most of the suspicious claims are exempted from audit if
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the adjusters are left to take the decision. The selection bias issue arises from the
discrepancy between the two audit rates.
As indicated in the introduction, we will use the claims with no specific audit
recommendation as the working sample, as they are subject to selection bias and
are processed in a way that is currently used by insurance companies. The claims
selected for random auditing give an unbiased fraud probability estimation. They
will be used as a holdout sample, to assess the eﬃciency of the statistical model.
We will first estimate the bivariate probit model on the suspicious claims of the
working sample (see Section 4.2). Then fraud probabilities which are not conditional
on an audit decision will be obtained. After that, we will compare these results with
those obtained for the holdout sample. The ability of the bivariate model to replace
a costly random auditing strategy will thus be assessed. A similar approach is
followed in Section 5, where auditing policies are designed from the estimation of
fraud probabilities.
The fraud rate on audited claims is 19.8% in the working sample. The application
to the holdout sample of a fraud equation estimated on the working sample does not
modify the average fraud probability, which remains close to twenty percent. On
the other hand, the similar fraud rate for the holdout sample is equal to 7.2%. Here
we have an example of the overestimation induced by selection bias, as mentioned
in the introduction. A single equation model on fraud is unable to even partially
fill the gap between the two fraud rates. Determining to what extent a selection
model applied to the working sample can fill this gap is the purpose of the statistical
analysis which follows.
This diﬀerence between the two fraud rates can be explained by the claim screen-
ing performed by the experts. It can also be explained by a deterrence eﬀect. The
propensity to defraud should decrease with the audit rate, if we assume that poli-
cyholders are aware of the audit policy. This argument does not seem convincing in
the present situation, as policyholders who were concerned by the random auditing
strategy were not informed of their participation in the experiment. Economic mod-
els on fraud (see Picard (2000) for a survey) usually assume that policyholders are
aware of their company’s auditing policy. Inclusion of deterrence eﬀects in statistical
models on fraud is discussed by Tennyson & Salsas (2002) and Dionne, Giuliano &
Picard (2002).
Let us conclude this section with comments on fraud indicators. This database
was used in other publications (Artis et al. (2002), Caudill et al. (2005)), in which
possible fraud indicators are listed3. We also considered the seniority of the poli-
cyholder and the number of previous claims, as used in Belhadji et al. (2000). We
did not have fraud indicators related with bodily injury damages and medical treat-
3See for instance Artis et al. (2002), page 328.
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ment types, like Weisberg and Derrig (1998), so we could not include that kind of
regressors.
4 The bivariate probit model: Theory and appli-
cations to selection bias assessment
4.1 The theoretical model
Using the notations from Section 2, we define the bivariate probit model on a sample
of claims suspected of fraud. Referring to Figure 1, the bivariate model described
below is applied to the right part of the tree associated with a usual auditing strategy.
A bivariate model on the audit and fraud equations with a joint distribution of
the two random components will be able to assess a fraud probability conditioned
by the individual characteristics of the claims and by the audit variable A. Once
this estimation has been made, we have a fraud probability for suspicious claims
which is unconditional on an audit decision and which can be used in an optimal
audit policy.
The bivariate probit model with censoring includes, first of all, an audit equation
defined on all the claims that are suspected of fraud. This equation is defined in the
following way
Ai = 1[A∗i≥0]
; A∗i = (xA)i βA + (εA)i ; (εA)i ∼ N (0, 1) . (2)
The binary variable A is the sign indicator of a latent variable A∗. The variance
of the random variable (εA)i can be set equal to one without loss of generality,
because of the invariance of A with respect to the multiplication of A∗ by a positive
constant. The regression components in the linear equation can be defined on the
policy to which the claim is related, or can be claim-specific. They are represented
by a line vector. The parameters are stacked in a column vector which enables a
cross product.
The fraud equation is defined on audited claims only. We then write
If Ai = 1 : Fi = 1[F∗i ≥0]; F
∗
i = (xF )i βF + (εF )i . (3)
The random variable (εF )i also follows a standard normal distribution.
If we retain a bivariate normal distribution for ((εA)i , (εF )i), i.e.µ
(εA)i
(εF )i
¶
∼ N2
µµ
0
0
¶
,
µ
1 ρ
ρ 1
¶¶
ρ ∈ [−1, 1], (4)
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we obtain a bivariate probit model. The sign of the correlation coeﬃcient ρ is
of paramount importance to the estimation of fraud risk conditional on the audit
variable.
In this censored setting, three levels are possible for the dependent variables.
Let us compute the corresponding probabilities. We have suppressed the individual
index for the sake of simplicity.
1. If the claim is not audited, the fraud variable is not observed. We then have
P [A = 0] = P [εA < −xAβA] = Φ(−xAβA) = 1− Φ(xAβA), (5)
where Φ is the distribution function of a standard normal variable and
Φ(xAβA) = pA = P [A = 1] = E(A).
The last equality in (5) results from the symmetry in the distribution of εA.
The bivariate model is estimated on the suspicious claims only, hence the
probability P [A = 0] would be described as P [A = 0 |S = 1] if expressed on
all the incoming claims as in Section 2.
2. If the claim is audited and if fraud is established, we can write
P [A = 1, F = 1 ] = P [εA ≥ −xAβA, εF ≥ −xFβF ]
= P [εA ≤ xAβA, εF ≤ xFβF ] = P [Φ(εA) ≤ Φ(xAβA), Φ(εF ) ≤ Φ(xFβF )] .
Again, we used symmetry in the distribution of the random components. The
variables Φ(εA) and Φ(εF ) follow a uniform distribution on [0, 1] and the distri-
bution function of (Φ(εA),Φ(εF )) is a Gaussian copula indexed by ρ. Writing
fraud probability as
pF = P [F = 1] = P [Φ(εF ) ≤ Φ(xFβF )] = Φ(xFβF ),
we denote the Gaussian copula in the following way
C(ρ, pA, pF ) = P [Φ(εA) ≤ pA, Φ(εF ) ≤ pF ] = P
£
εA ≤ Φ−1(pA), εF ≤ Φ−1(pF )
¤
.
This copula relates a bivariate Gaussian distribution function to its marginal
components. Hence the probability of interest is equal to
P [A = 1, F = 1] = C(ρ, pA, pF ). (6)
3. The probability of the last level (the claim is audited but not fraudulent) is
the complementary value
P [A = 1, F = 0] = P [A = 1]− P [A = 1, F = 1] = pA − C(ρ, pA, pF ).
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Maximizing the log-likelihood of the sample requires a computation of the Gaussian
copula and of its partial derivatives with respect to the parameters. This function
does not have a closed form with respect to Φ and Φ−1, unless ρ is equal to the
critical values −1, 0 and 1. It can be approximated by Gaussian quadratures (see
Dionne, Gagné, Vanasse (1998) for an application to panel data with endogenous
attrition).
We now present applications of the model to fraud probability prediction.
Under the null hypothesis ρ = 0, fraud probability does not depend on the audit
variable and we have
pF = P [F = 1] = P [F = 1 | A = 1]. (7)
Under the alternative assumption ρ 6= 0, selection bias arises because in that case
P [F = 1 | A = 1] = C(ρ, pA, pF )
pA
6= pF . (8)
These probabilities are confused in the application of a fraud risk model which does
not take into account selection bias. Indeed, the conditional probability P [F =
1 | A = 1] is estimated on the audited claims whereas the unconditional probability
pF should be applied to the incoming suspicious claims in order to design an audit
policy. To gain a better understanding of the influence of selection bias, some basic
properties of bivariate Gaussian copulas are recalled and applied to our context.
Three critical values for ρ will be mentioned. First, we have
C(0, pA, pF ) = pA × pF
since the random variables εA and εF are independent if ρ = 0. In this case, all
the fraud probabilities given in equations (7) and (8) are equal. Second, εA and
εF are equal a.e. if ρ = 1, which implies C(1, pA, pF ) = min(pA, pF ). This value is
the upper bound for a bivariate copula, and is known as the upper Fréchet bound.
Lastly, we have εA = −εF a.e. if ρ = −1, hence C(−1, pA, pF ) = max(pA+pF−1, 0).
Again, we reach the lower bound for a bivariate copula.
The map ρ −→ C(ρ, pA, pF ) is increasing on the interval [−1, 1] for any value of
(pA, pF )
4. Hence the same result holds for P [F = 1 | A = 1] in the bivariate probit
model, whereas P [F = 1 | A = 0] is a decreasing function of ρ.
4The distribution function of (εA, εF ) and hence the copula are integrals of the bivariate
Gaussian density on negative orthants. Hence the increasing link with ρ is not surprising. We
did not find a proof of this result in the statistical literature, but it is verified from numerical
computations.
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4.2 Empirical applications of the bivariate probit model
The selection model should only be applied to the claims which are suspected of
fraud, which requires a variable pointing out such claims. Unfortunately, the nature
of the claims with respect to fraud suspicion is not available in our database for the
claims with no specific recommendation for audit. Among the 49290 claims which
were not audited in the working sample (see Figure 2), some are suspected of fraud
(S = 1) and exempted from audit due to the adjusters’ decision, and some are not
suspicious. However, the value of S is not available in the database.
In order to apply the selection model described above, we will create a set of
suspicious claims, partly from simulation. This set must contain the 2567 claims
finally transferred to the SIU, as A = 1 implies S = 1. On the other hand, the
proportion of suspicious claims should be the same in the working and the holdout
sample since they have the same structure. We estimated an audit equation on the
holdout sample, which provided a suspicion probability conditioned on regression
components since all the suspicious claims are supposed to be audited in this pop-
ulation. Then we selected claims from those that were not audited in the working
sample, using a random sampling scheme and this suspicion equation5. Together
with the claims transferred to the SIU, these form a set of suspicious claims in the
working sample which has the same weight as those in the hold out sample (i.e.
18.6%). Therefore, we have 18.6%× 51857 ' 9640 suspicious claims in the working
sample, 2567 of which are audited. The other claims were drawn at random from
the suspicion equation. This approach is only makeshift but we in any case find it
interesting to estimate the selection model. Random auditing is not often carried
out in the real world (which creates a selection bias problem), and a suspicion vari-
able should be easy to determine during the first step of claims screening. Since we
maintained the proportion of suspicious claims observed with random auditing, the
audit rate for suspicious claims in the working sample is 0.0495/0.186 = 0.266.
Let us give an example to illustrate the importance of selection bias in relation
with the bivariate probit model. We will compare the unconditional fraud proba-
bility of an incoming suspicious claim with average characteristics, and the fraud
probability if such a claim is audited with the audit policy used in the working sam-
ple. We expect diﬀerent results from equation (8). We will compute pF = P [F = 1]
as a function of ρ under the following constraints
pA = P [A = 1] = 0.266; P [F = 1 | A = 1] = 0.198. (9)
We just derived the proportion of audited claims among suspicious claims, hence
5Using suspicion probabilities unchanged from the holdout sample would have led to an excess
of suspicious claims (22% instead of 18.6%). The suspicion frequency should be the same in the
working and holdout samples, as these samples have the same structure. Hence we corrected the
intercept in order to obtain the 18.6% frequency.
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the value given to pA. The frequency of fraudulent claims among those audited is
0.198, which explains the constraint on P [F = 1 | A = 1]. The unconditional fraud
probability which we denote as pF (ρ) is a solution of the equation
C(ρ, pA, pF (ρ)) = P [A = 1, F = 1] = P [F = 1 | A = 1]× P [A = 1]
⇔ C(ρ, 0.266, pF (ρ)) = 0.198× 0.266 ' 0.0527. (10)
Since the claims adjusters are supposed to contribute expertise in their audit
decision, we expect that
pF (ρ) = P [F = 1] < P [F = 1 | A = 1] = 0.198.
Indeed, the unconditional probability of fraud pF (ρ) is a weighted average of the
two conditional probabilities P [F = 1 | A = 1] and P [F = 1 | A = 0]. The latter
probability should be lower than the first one because of the information brought
by the audit decision. In this case, ρ should be positive since we have
ρ > 0⇐⇒ pF (ρ) < 0.198
from the equivalence
ρ > 0⇐⇒ 0.198×0.186 = C(ρ, 0.186, pF (ρ)) > C(0, 0.186, pF (ρ)) = 0.186×pF (ρ).
We used the increasing property of the copula with respect to ρ.
Let us give values for pF (ρ) under the constraints given in (9) and (10). We let ρ
increase from 0 to 1 with an increment equal to 0.1. Results are presented in Table
1.
Table 1: Unconditional fraud probability for an incoming suspicious claim
with average characteristics, as a function of the correlation coeﬃcient
ρ pF (ρ)
0 0.198
0.1 0.166
0.2 0.140
0.3 0.117
0.4 0.099
0.5 0.084
0.6 0.072
0.7 0.063
0.8 0.056
0.9 0.053
1 0.053
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Suppose that ρ = 0.5. The fraud probability of an incoming suspicious claim
with average characteristics is 2.4 times less than if this claim has been audited.
This drastically modifies the threshold of a score designed to select claims for audit.
From Table 1, the unconditional fraud probability of an incoming suspicious
claim with average characteristics is equal to 7.2% (i.e. the fraud rate observed
without selection bias in our database) for ρ = 0.6. Hence a positive estimated
correlation coeﬃcient is expected on the working sample.
The estimated correlation coeﬃcient strongly depends on the choice of regression
components in each equation. On the whole, we noticed that bρ decreased with the
amount of information used in the regressions. Variations of bρ due to the sampling
scheme of suspicious claims in the working sample are much less important than
those due to the choice of regression components in the bivariate model.
Let us recall the steps of our estimation procedure.
• First, we must create a suspicion variable which is missing for the non-audited
claims in the working sample. To reach this goal, we estimate suspicion prob-
abilities on the holdout sample as it has no missing information. Then we
use these probabilities to draw claims at random from the non-audited claims
of the holdout sample. We modified these probabilities to obtain the same
frequency (18.6%) of suspicious claims in both samples.
• Then the bivariate probit model is estimated on the suspicious claims set of
the working sample. This set contains the 2567 audited claims which are
definitely suspicious, and other claims drawn at random in the first step. The
set depends then on the sampling scheme, and contains 0.186× 51857 ' 9640
claims. As explained in this section, we obtain fraud probabilities which do
not depend on the audit decision.
Let us detail for instance estimation results with a medium number of regression
components. All of these results are significant at a one-percent level. With this
constraint, the set of covariates retained in each equation cannot be increased with
the variables at our disposal. Maximum likelihood estimations for the equation that
generates the sampling scheme and for the bivariate probit model are given in Table
2.
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Table 2: Regression results in the bivariate probit model (working sample)
and in the equation on fraud suspicion (hold out sample)
Sampling scheme Bivariate probit model
Dependent variables Fraud suspicion Audit Fraud
(S) (A) (F )
Sample Holdout sample Working Working
sample, S = 1 sample, A = 1
Size of the sample 12928 ' 9640 2567
Parameters cβS, (S = A) cβA cβF
Intercept −1.53 −1.08 −1.90
Seniority of policyholder:
less than one year 0.21
Motorbike 0.41
Automobile, private use 0.39
Number of previous claims 0.06
Coverage: Third party liability only 0.71 0.74
Coverage: Third party liability +
theft, arson and glasses 0.66 0.53
Third party at fault 0.33
Use of the no-fault system 0.29
Age of the policyholder −0.003 −0.005
The results depend on the regression components and on random sampling for
the bivariate probit model. The estimators are stable with respect to suspicious
claims sampling. With this set of regression components, we havebρ ' 0.51.
The estimated unconditional fraud probability for incoming suspicious claims is
8.4% on average. The selection model provides a satisfactory result with this set of
regression components, as the goal is to reach a 7.2% ratio from a starting point -
the fraud rate for audited claims in the working sample - which is 19.8%.
As mentioned above, the estimated correlation coeﬃcient increases if fewer re-
gression components are retained. The estimated coeﬃcient ranges between 0.36
and 0.64, depending on the set of regression components. The average uncondi-
tional fraud probabilities range between 6.9% and 10.8%.
The positive result obtained in this section is that the selection model is able
to get very close to the actual fraud rate, which can only be reached through ran-
dom auditing. The weakness of selection models applied to censored data is that
estimation results are highly dependent on the regression components set.
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5 Applications of selection bias models to audit-
ing policies design
In this section, we will focus on the design of audit decisions based on a short term
analysis. We balance estimated audit costs and gains from fraud detection. The gain
is the product of the claim settlement’s reserved cost and of the fraud probability6.
The reserved cost of the claim settlement is determined by the adjuster during the
first screening of the claim. Hence it is known by the insurance company before the
audit decision, which is not the case with the audit cost. The audit cost recorded
in the database corresponds to all the steps of the claim examination, including the
first screening.
Let us denote the audit cost related to the SIU examination for claim i as aci,
and ci as the reserved claim cost. A transfer of this claim to the SIU generates an
expected gain in the short run if
bE [ciFi −ACi] > 0⇔ bE[Fi] = bP [Fi = 1] > bE[ACi]
ci
. (11)
Indeed, ci bE[Fi] is the expected gain from audit if claim i is transferred to the
SIU. The expected fraud probability is derived from a bivariate probit model in what
follows. The audit cost is only known ex post (hence its random variable status in
this step of the computation).
Information on audit costs is needed to derive the expected values bE[ACi]. The
average audit costs are given in Table 3, according to the status of the claim and
the sample.
Table 3: Average audit costs (including the first screening)
Average audit costs Holdout sample Working sample
of claims (A = S) (A 6= S)
A = 0 C=36.97 C=37.73
A = 1, F = 0 C=59.81 C=67.82
A = 1, F = 1 C=231.71 C=222.84
These results clearly indicate that the more likely a claim is to be fraudulent, the
more thoroughly it must be examined by the adjusters. This increases the audit cost.
6In the economic literature on fraud (see Picard (2000) for a survey) the policyholder holds
a private information on the amount of the loss. A fraudulent claim consists of misreporting
this amount. The insurer can commit to a compensation scheme, designed in such a way that
fair reporting is an optimal strategy for the policyholder. See Boyer (2001) for fraud prevention
policies which involve the public authorities through taxes.
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The averages are similar in both samples. The diﬀerence between the average audit
costs for claims that are transferred to the SIU and those that are not fraudulent can
be explained by the stricter selection for SIU in the working sample, which makes
these claims more suspicious. Hence selection bias is also seen in audit costs.
The audit costs in Table 3 correspond to all the steps of claims examination,
including the mandatory first screening which is not performed by the SIU. The
average audit cost charged to the SIU will be set equal to
acNF = 67.82− 37.73 = C=30.09; acF = 222.84− 37.73 = C=185.11, (12)
where acNF and acF relate to non-fraudulent and fraudulent claims. This computa-
tion implicitly supposes that the cost of the first screening does not depend on the
eventual status of the claim.
The expected audit cost clearly depends on fraud probability since acF > acNF .
If we condition this expectation on average values for each level of the audited claims,
we obtain bE[ACi] = ³ bP [Fi = 1]× acF´+ ³ bP [Fi = 0]× acNF´
= acNF +
³ bP [Fi = 1]× (acF − acNF )´ .
An audit policy can be designed from this assessment of the audit cost. The rule
given in (11) suggests that claim i should be transferred to the SIU if
ci > ac
F − acNF & bP [Fi = 1] > acNF
ci − (acF − acNF )
. (13)
Since the probability threshold must be less than one, the first condition amounts
to ci > acF . We will use the holdout sample to compare the audit policies derived
from diﬀerent fraud models. All suspicious claims are audited if random auditing is
performed thoroughly. In this case there is no selection bias and the target audit rate
is obtained from a fraud equation estimated on the audited claims in the holdout
sample. From the fraud equation specified in the bivariate model of Table 2, with
the selection rule and the audit costs given in (13) and (12), we obtain a target audit
rate for suspicious claims of 36.7%.
Let us assess the influence of selection bias on audit policies. Suppose that the
fraud equation specified in Table 2 is estimated on the audited claims of the working
sample. The optimal audit rate on suspicious claims of the working sample goes up
to 62%, which reflects the overestimation of fraud probability if selection bias is
neglected.
Let us see how the target audit rate can be approximated by a selection model.
The proportion of suspicious claims which should be audited in the working sample
is 39% if we use the selection model estimated in Table 2. This audit rate is very
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close to the target rate obtained from random auditing (i.e. 36.7%), which is a
satisfactory result.
If the set of regression components varies in the regression, the optimal audit rate
ranges between 33 and 45% in our diﬀerent trials. These rates strongly depend on
the set of regression components through the estimated correlation coeﬃcient. This
result is obviously negative, as sound risk assessment derived from random auditing
cannot be anticipated precisely from the selection model. However the bivariate
probit model points out selection bias and can justify a random auditing strategy
which is not often employed by insurance companies.
In what follows, the eﬃciency of an audit policy is summarized by the average
gain per suspicious claim. As for the selection rule given in (13), we compare each
audit policy to a zero audit strategy. Hence gains are the reserved costs of the
audited claims that are proved to be fraudulent, and losses are the audit costs
charged to the SIU. The eﬃciency of the previously detailed audit policies is almost
the same for all of them. This may seem surprising, as the audit rates exhibit great
variations. For all these policies, the average gain per suspicious claim is close to
C=52. This stability with respect to audit rates is explained by the shape of the
eﬃciency curves. Claims are sorted in decreasing order with respect to the expected
gain bE [ciFi −ACi], and the curve is the average gain per suspicious claim expressed
as a function of the audit rate. Figure 3 is related to the bivariate model estimated
in Table 2.
All the eﬃciency curves have the same shape. This one reaches its maximum for
an audit rate close to 60%. The stability of the curve for audit rates greater than
30% explains why the diﬀerent policies have similar eﬃciencies.
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Figure 3: Average gain (euros) per suspicious claim as a function of the percentage
of audited claims
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6 Conclusions
This paper presented a statistical approach which counteracts selection bias without
using a random auditing strategy. A two equation model for audit and fraud (a
bivariate probit model with censoring) was estimated on a sample of suspicious
claims for which the experts were left to take the audit decision. The expected
overestimation of fraud risk derived from a single equation model on audited claims
was corrected. Results were rather close to those obtained with a random auditing
strategy, at the expense of some instability with respect to the regression components
set. Then we compared auditing policies derived from a statistical correction of
selection bias, and policies obtained from random auditing.
Let us first comment briefly on the instability of selection bias assessment with re-
spect to the set of regression components. This instability is actually consubstantial
with the censored character of the data. We presented censored and non-censored
selection models in the introduction. Such models are made up of a selection vari-
able (e.g. audit) and a variable of interest (e.g. fraud). They are censored if the
variable of interest is only observed for the selected individuals. In a non-censored
model, the influence of the selection variable on the variable of interest is easily
derived from a comparison of two samples (selected versus non-selected individuals)
with respect to the variable of interest. In a censored context, this influence is only
assessed through the variation of estimated selection probabilities on the selected
individuals. This estimated probability plays the role of a supplementary covariate
in the regression model that is related to the variable of interest. Now this proba-
bility is derived from the information already used in the regression. Selection bias
reflects a more intricate specification for the distribution related to the variable of
interest instead of being based on observed diﬀerences in the non-censored setting7.
If the selection model is unstable for censored data, it is however of greatest interest
precisely in this context.
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